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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----oooOooo-----
ROBERT E. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DIONNE BRADLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
-----oooOooo-----
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
-----oooOooo-----
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 15571 
This is an action for personal injury sustained by pedes-
trian in an auto/pedestrian accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury which found plaintiff and 
defendant equally negligent, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the 
defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmation of the lower court judgment 
and denial of Motion for New Trial. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of February 7, 1976, plaintiff was in the 
process of crossing Sunnyside Avenue at its intersection with Guards-
man Way en route to the University of Utah and defendant was driving 
a 1971 Ford Matador automobile west on Sunnyside Avenue on her way 
to the Salt Lake City Public Library when they were involved in an 
auto/pedestrian accident. 
Plaintiff was injured as a result of that collision; how-
ever, the question, nature or extent of his damages is not before this 
Court on appeal. 
At trial, the case was submitted to the jury on a 
general verdict with special Interrogatories after all of the evidence 
was in. After some deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for defen-
dant and judgment of no cause of action based upon its determination 
that plaintiff and defendant were equally negligent and responsible for 
the collision._ This appeal re suits from that verdict and the lower court's 
denial of plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE JURY'S DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT WERE EQUALLY NEGLIGENT IS 
CONSISTENT BOTH WITH THE LAW AND WITH 
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL; AND THE 
LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A review of the evidence will show that reasonable men 
-2-
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could have come to the same conclusion as did the jury, to wit~ that 
plai!J.tiff and defendant were equally negligent and responsible for the 
accident. Certainly, it is the law in Utah that the verdict of a jury 
must not be set aside unless a reasonable man could not come to the 
same conclusion even when all of the evidence and inferences fairly 
derived therefrom are taken in a light most favorable to the prevail-
ing party. See Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P. 2d 66 (1960). 
The verdict is protected by a bulwerk of rules best articulated in the 
auto/pedestrian case of Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 
680 (1954) as follows: 
... First, by the general proposition 
that the judgment and proceedings in the 
lower court are presumptively correct with 
the burden upon defendant to show error. 
Second, where a trial judge has passed upon 
a question and a jury, presumably fair and 
impa:t:tial, has made a finding, while such is 
not controlling, it is at least entitled to some 
consideration and should not be wholly ig-
nored in reviewing the situation and attempting 
to see, as objectively as possible, whether 
reasonable minds might so conclude. Third, 
that the court must review the evidence, to-
getherwith every inference fairly arising 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and similarly, must consider any 
lack or failure of evidence in the same light, 
which we do in reviewing the facts here. 
The most helpful expos~ on the factors and elements to be 
considzred in a case of this type on appeal is found in the case of 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P. Zd 236 
-3-
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the fact to be such as will support the ruling 
which we are called upon to review; but if, 
after giving due consideration to the fact 
that the trial judge is better able to weigh 
conflicting evidence, the evidence be such 
nevertheless as to imuel but one reasonable 
conclusion, and that as to the fact adverse 
to the ruling, it would be our duty as an 
appellate court to so declare, notwithstand-
ing there might be some conflict in the 
evidence. 
In Moser v. Zions Co-op Mere. Inst., 
[114 Utah 58, 65, 197 P. 2d 136 (1948)], 
this court stated that if reasonable minds 
could have found as the jury did from the 
evidence before it, then this court cannot 
say that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the party's motion for new trial on 
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict. [Emphasis added.] 
In short, this Court held that it was the province of the 
jury to weigh the conflicting evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses and to determine the questions of fact including the ultimate 
facts of negligence and causation. In that case, upon examination of 
the evidence as disclosed by the record it was apparent that there was 
a substantial conflict of evidence as to the material issues of fact and 
t.l,.e Court, accordingly, held that there was no abuse of discretion by 
the lower court in denying plaintiff's Motions. 
The evidence in this case regarding negligence and 
causation was not so clear as to impel but one reasonable conclusion, 
and that as to a fact adverse to the lower court ruling. The following 
exerpts and summaries of the testimony of plaintiff, defendant, 
- 5-
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Rayn10nd W. Ward and ArtieR. Ban.~s, Jr., the four witnesses who 
testified about the circumstances of the auto/pedestrian accident, 
demonstrate a substantial conflict of evidence not only as to the 
material facts in general, but as to the ultimate facts of negligence 
and causation as well. 
As a review of the record will show, there was sub-
stantial credible evidence justifying the jury's conclusion that plaintiff 
and defendant were equally negligent. With respect to the plaintiff's 
negligence, if the facts are that he sprinted out in front of defendant's 
automobile, out of a place of safety and into a place of danger, it was 
reasonable and prudent for the jury to conclude that he was negligent. 
Or, if plaintiff walked across the crosswalk on Sunnyside Avenue and 
said to himself, I'm in the crosswalk and everybody else in the world 
that may come along this street must watch out for me and for my 
safety and must not get me in a position of danger, then the jury was 
reasonable a..-:td prudent in concluding that plaintiff was negligent. Or, 
if plaintiff walked across that street and never looked east and never 
paid attention to traffic, then the jury was reasonable and prudent in 
finding hir.::t negligent. Any of the above findings of fact, or any com-
bination thereof, v;ould be sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. 
Looking specifically to the record, it shows that Officer 
ArtieR. Banks, Jr. of the Salt Lake City Police Department L'1vestigated 
the acc~dent. IR. T. 14) Although Officer Banks did not recall whether 
-6-
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he spoke with the plaintiff about the circumstances of the accident 
on the night of the accident or the follo\ving day (R. T. 20}, he did 
recall that when he spoke with and questioned the plaintiff, he 
appeared to hear and understand the questions and his answers were 
responsive. (R. T. 21} Appellant's Brief would have us believe that 
when plaintiff spoke with Officer Banks he was under the influence of 
medication, in considerable pain, and in-and-out of consciousness, 
and that anything he might have said at that time is not to be believed. 
Thus, the obvious inference that plaintiff did not know what he was 
saying. However, plaintiff's answers to all of Officer Bank's questions 
were responsive, the obvious inference being that he understood the 
questions and gave the appropriate answers. When asked by Officer 
Banks "what happened" plaintiff responded that when he was halfway 
across the eros swalk he saw defendant's car approaching and "sprinted 
to try to get across the road." (R. T. 22} That statement was credible. 
That is consistent with the testimony of Raymond W. Ward 
who was driving four to five car lengths behind the defendant (R. T. 3} 
at the time of the accident and who was able to see the plaintiff through 
the rear and front windows of defendant's automobile. (F. T. 3} He 
stated that plaintiff was traveling across the crosswalk at a "medium 
to a fast gate. He was walking along. He wasn't going slow. 11 (R. T. 10} 
Dionne Bradley testified that she was traveling at a speed of approxi-
mately thirty (30} miles per hour !R. T. 31, 33, l7l}; that she was about 
-7-
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fi:ty (50) feet away from the plaintiff when she first saw him (R. T. 31); 
and that although she immediately swerved to the left she was unable 
to avoid the ensuing collision. (R. T. 32) Further, the evidence showed 
that when she first saw the plaintiff he was right in front of her (R. T. 
31, 32) and that the right front of her car was the probable point of im-
pact. (R. T. 33, 171) Defendant would have been traveling about forty-
four (44) feet per second. If we are to believe defendant's testimony 
that plaintiff was in the middle of the defendant's lane, fifty (50) feet 
away when she first saw him, even if he had been sprinting he would have 
been unable to take more than a step or so, if that, before impact. 
Appellant's Brief alleges at one point that there was no 
serious disagreement as to the cause or causes of the accident. That's 
not true. For example, contrary in some respects to what he told 
Officer Banks, plaintiff testified at the time of trial that he stopped at 
the corner of Greenwood Terrace and Sunnyside Avenue, waited for two 
eastbound automobiles to pass by, and then proceeded north across 
Sunnyside Avenue without looking to the east or west for vehicular 
traffic. (R. T. 40, 70, 122) After entering the crosswalk, plaintiff 
continued, he noticed a car westbotmd, but it seemed to be far enough 
away and 1noving slow enough that he could safely cross the street. (R. T. 
40, 70) Further, plaintiff stated thet from the time he first observed 
the aut01nobile and co:1tinucd to v:alk across the street, he did not again 
look to ti:e east tc•\R.n1 westbr~'-tnd traffi•2 LL'1til ju3t before impact. (H. T. 
-8-
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12S, 126) l\or, was he aware of the sound of a car or its headlights 
until that time. (R. T. 125, 1 26) Plaintiff admitted that, at the time 
of trial, his recollection of what transpired after the collision was 
confused and that his recollection of events that occurred prior to 
impact were not "crystaline. " (R. T. 126) 
Mr. Ward's testimony also conflicted with that of other 
\vi.tnesses on several other questions of fact. For instance, he testi-
fied that the day of the accident was a clear day and that at the time of 
the accident it was still quite light. (R. T. 2) At one point he stated 
that he did not believe the defendant had her headlights on at the time 
of the accident (R. T. 4), and later added that he was certain he did 
not have his headlights on and equally certain that the defendant did 
not have her lights on. (R. T. 8-9) Further, he stated that none of 
the other automobiles on the road at the time had their headlights on, 
IR, T. 9) 
~While on cross-examination, Officer Banks stated that at 
the time he was dispatched to the accident, he was at or near the 
Salt Lake City limits on State StJCeet. (R. T, 18) He testified that 
although it was still fairly light at the time he had his headlights on. 
\R. T. 18) Further, he testified that aiter arriving at the scene of the 
accident he investigated defendant's automobile and found her head-
lights to still be on. (R. T. 19) 
Dicmne Bradley, de:endant, testified that at the time of 
-9-
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the accident it was dark and that her headlights were on low beam. 
(R. T. 32, 170) 
Again, Mr. Ward testified that although he observed 
the defendant for two (2) to three (3) seconds prior to the collision, he 
did not observe plaintiff look to the east, toward defendant's automobile. 
(R. T. 10) In fact, he added later in his testimony that plaintiff did not 
seem to be aware of any vehicular traffic. (R. T. 11) 
The jury was properly instructed on the law. The follow-
ing Instructions, along with others not particularly germane to this 
appeal, were given to the jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
As used in these instructions, "negligence" 
means the failure of a party to do what a 
reasonably prudent person would have done, 
or doing what a resonably prudent person 
would not have done, under the circumstances 
of this situation, to protect oneself and others 
from the risk of harm. Negligence may con-
sist of acting or of omitting to act. Negligence 
of plaintiff toward himself does not bar the 
plaintif£ from recovery of damages unless his 
negligence is as great or greater than the 
negligence of the defendant against whom re-
covery is sought. If plaintiff's negligence is 
not as great as defendant's negligence, damages 
allowed will be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to the 
plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
In 3.dditicm to this general definitioo:1 of neg-
ligence, there are other rules of law, as well 
as statutes enacted by the legislatur-e for sa:e 
-]0-
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operation of vehicles on the highways. A 
person who fails to comply with such rules or 
statutes is negligent, as that term is used in 
the verdict and in the court's instructions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
You are instructed that it was the duty of 
each of the parties, defendant and plaintiff, 
to meet the standard of a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances of this case, 
to avoid risk of harm to himself and to the 
other party, and to observe and be aware of 
the condition of the highway, traffic thereon, 
and other existing conditions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
A driver of a motor vehicle has a duty n0t 
to drive the vehicle on a highway at a speer:'. 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions, and having regard to the actual 
and potential hazards then existing, and speed 
is to be so controlled as may be necessary to 
avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or 
other conveyance on or entering the highway, 
in compliance with legal requirements and the 
duty of all persons to use due care. The statutes 
also require that the driver of a vehicle shall, 
con sis tent with the foregoing, drive at an 
appropriate reduced speed when approaching 
and crossi.Ylg an intersection, or when special 
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or 
other traffic, or by reason of weather or highway 
conditions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
A driver of a motor vehicle is required to 
yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping 
if necessary to so yield, to a pedestrian cross-
ing th~ roadway within a cross>valk when the 
pedestrian is up,rn th2 half of the roadway up,on 
which the vehicle is trayeling, or when the ped-
estrio.n is apJ::ll·,,aching so closely from the opposite 
- ll-
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half of the roadway· as to be in danger. 
The perscm having the right-of-v,;ay may 
assume tha;: the other -...vill yield. Failure of 
defendant to so yield the rigd-of-way to 
plaintiff v;ould constitute negligence on defen-
dant's part, if you so find, 
1:.\SJ:RUCT10.:-J NO. 13 
It is the duty of every operator of a motor 
vehicle to exercise ordinary care and keep a 
careful lookout ahead and about him. The 
exercise of ordinary care requires him to 
make observations at a point or points where 
his observa:ions will be efficient for protection 
frorn injury- to persons or property, requires 
the seasonable and effective use of a driver's 
sense of sight to observe timely, not only the 
presence, location and movement of other users 
of the highway, pedestrians as well as "'>ehicles, 
but traffic signs and signals, obstructions to 
vis:io:1, and e'.rer)rthir'_g el3e \.vhich might \.Varn 
him of possible danger. 
1-"iSTRGCTIO:'-J :0i0. 14 
You are instructed that every motor vehicle 
operator or pedestrian has the right to assume 
and act upon the assumption that every other 
motor -...-ehicle operator or pedestrian "\\rill ob-
serve the rules of the road and -...vill not other-
VIise negligentl;· e:lqJOse himself to or put others 
in danger; :c11d he nray continue in that assump-
tion u.r1til it becon1es apparent, or in the 
exercise of ordinary- care ought to be apparent, 
to hirC~ that son1~ other rnotor vehicle operator 
or pedestrian is, by \vrongful conduct, creating 
dange:.~, uris not a\vare of, or ca1mc)t avoid tl1at 
dange:c. L"l such a sihution, every 1notor v2hi:~le 
operat,Jr or pedestrian mu~t, in order tcJ be> free 
fron1 negligence, m::.ke all reasonable effo :-ts t1) 
a~,-oid cullisii):-!. )r injo.1ry, even though th'2 other 
111o;_or --.-ehicle operator or pedestria!"l is in the 
v.:_cong i:1 !~~s C'>Ul'.:>e oi conduct. 
- I '-
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\',-ith respect to plaintiff's duties and responsibilities as a pedestrian, 
the cuurt instructed the jury as follows: 
INSTRUCTIO'l NO. 15 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, it is 
also necessary for you to determine whether 
the plaintiff, Robert E. Anderson, at and 
immediately prior to the time of the accident, 
was negligent with respect to caring for his 
own safety. 
The terms ''negligence'' I have previously 
defined for you, and this definition you will 
bear in mind, together with the following 
instructions, in determining your answer to 
this question. 
Every person in all situations has a d~r,- to 
exercise o:-dinac)' care for his own safety. 
This does not mean that he is required at all 
hazards to avoid inj1_:ry-. His duty, rather, is 
that of taking such precaution to avoid iiJ.jury 
as would be taken by an ordi_narily prudent 
man in situations the same as or similar to 
that of the plaintiff at and immediately prior 
to the time of the accident. 
To be free of negligence, one must use 
ordi..cary care LYJ. the exercise of his intelligence 
and of his facilities o£ sight and hearing, to the 
end that he may become aware of the existence 
of danger to hin1. The failure to use such 
intelligence and faculties, thereby failing to dis-
cov·er danger, is negligence, as I have before 
defined that term for you. 
His likewise the duty of everyone to recognize 
and appreciat-e all dangers which are open and 
obvious to him, or v:hich would have been appre-
ciated at th,o ticc'1e by a reasonably prudent per-
S(JJ"'_ \.v}-u) is i.~ the exe:tcise of ordinary care. 
-13-
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INSTRUCTIO~ ~0. 16 
Before attempting to cross a street that 
is being used for the traffic of motor 
vehicles, it is a pedestrian's duty to make 
reasonable observations to learn the traffic 
conditions confronting him; to look to that 
vicinity from which, were a vehicle approach-
ing, it \vould immediately endanger his 
passage; and to make the determination which 
a reasonably prudent person would make under 
the san1e circumstances as to whether it is 
reasonably safe to attempt the crossing. What 
observations he should make, and what he 
should do for his own safety, while crossing 
the street are matters which the law does not 
attempt to regulate in detail and for all occa-
sions, except in this respect: It places upon 
him the continuing duty to exercise the care a 
reasonably prudeCJ.t person would observe to 
avoid an accident. 
1:\'STRUCTION ~0. 17 
In determining whether the plaintiff was 
negligent with regard to his own safety, you 
may take into accm.1..r1t the fact that a pedestrian 
crossir_g a busy street must be constantly vigilant 
for his safety with respect to all of the conditions 
around him, and tnat even if a car is seen approach-
ing. u.:cless it is so positioned as to constitute an 
imncediate hazard to him, he is not necessarily· 
obliged to focus full and undivided attention on 
that particular car and so calculate nis entire 
conduct as to avoid being struck by it. He need 
not anti=ipate tnat the driver will speed, fail to 
obsen:e, fail tn control her car, fail to afford 
him the right-of-v:ay, or otherwise be negligent 
unless, in the exercise of ordinary care, h~ 
observ.:;s or sh1uld ha.ve observeJ so:rnething to 
\Va rn him of sue h improper con duet.. 
- I -l-
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be::·He it. to wit: that the parties were equally negligent and respon-
si'::J'e for the accident. Nonetheless, even though the lov:er court 
satisfied the demands of Utah law plaintiff would have the decision 
overturned on the basis of Wisconsin law. 
Plaintiff would have this Court adopt Wisconsin's scope of 
revie·w on motions for new trials in comparative negligence type cases. 
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth the 
grounds upon which a motion for a new trial may be granted in this 
state: 
Rule 59. 0Jev,; Trials; Amendments rA Lv:lc:;-
ment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the prov1s10ns or 
Rule 61, a ne\\· trial -nay be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for 2.ny of the follcnvi·'lg cases; pro-.rided, 
however, that on a motion for a ne>v trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open 
the judg=eP.t if one has been entered, take addi-
Lional testin10ny, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judg-
n'lent: 
( l) Irregularity in the proceedi.'lgs of the 
court, jury CJr adverse party, or 3.ny order of 
the court, or abuse discretion by which either 
pa<:ty was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) .0.\isccmduct of the jury; and whenever any 
one or n'lore of the jurors have been i!lduced to 
assent to anv oeneral or special verdict, or to 
a finding on ·a,~~- question submitted to them by 
th2 u.urt, by resort tu a determination by· 
c-hJ..DCl~ IJr as a rcsul1: of bribery, such rniscon-
duct nl_2 y b:--- pr,>·.~ed by• the a££ida .. ,ri.t of an;/ one 
l S-
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of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material 
for the party making the application, which 
he could not, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given uncle r the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
[Emphasis added.] 
According to Section 270. 49(1) \'{. S. A., a new trial 
ma;· be ordered on any of four grounds in Wisconsin: (l) Errors 
in the t::-ia1; !2) verdict contrary to law or evidence; (3) excessive or 
inadeq\late damages; and/or (4) in the interest of justice. See, Tuschel 
,., Hil.asch. ! 7-± :0:. W. 2d 479 (\\'is. 1970) 
Appellant's Briei cites several Wisconsin Supreme 
Cou:r-t cases, in vthich ne\V trials \Vere granted in comparati-v~e negligence 
cases. b support of the geP.era1 proposition that a new trial should be 
grantee ii the pcrr:r:!ntage distribution oE negligence is clearly a_.;ain;:;t 
the g!'c>at \\·ei_ght and preponderance of the evidence and is contrary to 
- 1 "-
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coUioiCJ:o, The jury apportio,-,ed sixty percent (60%) of the cause of 
r.egligence to the plaintifi and forty percent (40'fo) to the defendant. 
The trial court granted a motion for a new trial, but failed to follow 
the proper procedure. On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
exercised its discretionary power to grant a new trial. That decision, 
hov;ever, was based upon the Wisconsin "interest of justice" clause 
not found in Utah law and was further granted for the reasons that 
11) there was no evidence to justify the apportionment of the causal 
:negligence and (2) the jury granted no damages although the testimony 
c: personal injuries was unccnotroverted. In the case sL':J ;-,,dic_c: there 
was some substantial evidence to justify the apportionment of the 
c2xsa1 r.eglige:nce and the jury never did reach the question of damages. 
In the case of Korleski v. LJ.ne, lG \'.'is. 2d 163, 102 
'<. -,_. Zd 23--! 11960) the Wisconsin Supreme Court is careful to note 
that thei' were not prepared to say ?.S a matter of law that the causal 
1:egligence CJf plaintiff did not equal the causal negligence of defendant; 
hcw:ever, the court did exercise its discretion under the "interest of 
Ao stated in the case of :?ollesche v. Transamerican Ins. 
Co., sunra, in utah it. up0n examination of the evidence as disclosed 
b:; tLe ::-eLr,_:--cl, it is 2.p~2.~·pnt th2t there i.s a substantial conflict of 
~\""ide::ce as ~.-u the rn3..tc:rial issues of fact in the case relative to v;rhich 
~ : l ·;: 
- l '/'-
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have foc:nd as the jury did, then the Utah Suprern.c Court will not 
int~riere with the lower court's affirn1ation of the jury's verdict. 
As stated in the case of S2ath ''· Ser.::da, 41 Wis.Zd 448, 164 N. W. 2d 
246 (1969) a new trial may be granted in the interest of justice in 
Wisconsin when jury findi.r1gs are contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence even though they are supported by credible evidence. In 
11liconsin, this is the rule whether applies to the question of damages, 
negligence, causation or comparison of negligence. See, Brunke v. 
Popp, 2l \\'is. 2d -158, 124 N. W. 2d 642 (1963); and Pingel v. Thielman, 
20 \'lis. 2d 246, 121 N. II.'. Zd 749 (1963). The standards for review in 
the two states are dis ti.YJ.c t. 
;\loreover, in the \Viscons:n cases of Loomans v. 
;\lib·:aukee I\·luma1 Ins. Co., SUDra. SDath v. Sereda, supra, DeGroff 
v. Sch...rnude, 38 l\'. \',', 2d 730 (1.'.'is. 1974), and I\·larkey v. Hauck, 73 
Wis. 2d 163, 242 N. W. 2d 914 11976) the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
simply afiirrned the lower court's grant of a new trial. As stated in 
each :Jf the above-mentioned cases, the reviewing court \vould nol 
reverst.: a deci.~ion granting a ne\-v trial in the interest of justice 
absent a showing of clear abus2 of discretion or an erroneous applica-
tion of the b.\'1. In short, the supei·i,)r court affirmed the lower court's 
ruling. Th:.. argun1ent.. thu.t this Court adopt a de jure o:· de facto 
- l 0-
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\!any of the philosophical arguments and pleas made in 
Ap;)ellant' s Brief are persuasive. It seems to tmderline and empha-
size the apparent weakness and injustice of a non pure-comparal:i.vt! 
negligence statute. Maybe Utah ought to adopt a pure comparative 
""egligence policy; nevertheless, as noted by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in the case of Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co,, 47 Wis. 2d 120, 
177 N. W. 2d 513 (1970) the state Supreme Court has authority to change 
the common law while the legislature is the best body equipped to adopt 
change from existing comparative negligence doctrine to a pure com-
para tive negligence doctrine. 
It is also alleged that defer.se counsel's "shac!d~d· remarks 
pl·ejndiced the jury. It is alleged that defense counsel stated that 
deic:!ldant should not be "shackled" with a judgment. The record will 
show that defense counsel in his closiEg arguments stated only that the 
ddendant should not be shackled with all of the responsibility for the 
accident as far as the negligence is concerned. IR. T. 212) 
CO:'\CLUSION 
Under uur judicial system, the people are the repository 
rof the P' .wer faml. ·which the !c.\·; is derived. ln short, the law is the 
c?:pl·t-;::;si~,:---. o[ tl--.c: y;,rill of the pcuple~ The functioning of a cross section 
oi t!ce citL-:·cn ry as a. jury is the mdhod by· which the people express 
thi .,.,--ill :n t: 1e ;:.:.pplil·c_di'>~1 cJ L~·-:, tr~ c'.Jntro-.•ersics \.vhich arise Wld~r it. 
(_1._-l~· d·~:- 1 1 ::2-t-:_c. '>Y-i ,:~t. rll_ll' C'I.~~Lillllirc12l and CJUr statut:..>ry pro\-i5iOn3 
- 1 ')-
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2.;: su:·e trial by jur:,· to citizens of this state. 
Courts, as final arbiters of law, could assume arbi-
trary, capricious and dangerous powers by presuming to determine 
questions of fact \Vhich litigants have a right to have passed upon by 
juries. One of the advantages of the jury system is to safeguard against 
such arbitrary and capricious power in the courts. To the credit oc the 
courts of this country, they have been extremely reluctant to infrin_se 
t:?On this right, and by leav-ing it unimpaired have kept the adminis tra-
tion o£ justice close to the people. Certainly, the rights of litigants 
should not be surrendered to the arbitrary· and capricious will of 
juries without regard to whether there is a violation of legal rights 
2.s a basis for recovery. Courts do have supervisory duties and 
resp:msibilities and control O'>er the action of juries which also is 
essential to the proper administration of justice. Nevertheless, it 
is important the courts remain cognizant of the vital importance of 
the privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice. Clearly, un-
less the question of comparati?e negligence is free from doubt, the 
court cannot pass upon it as a question of lav,;. If the court is in 
doubt y;hether reasonable men might arrive at different conclusioi'.s 
the:o that ver)' doubt determirtes th2 question to be one of fact for the 
jury a.nd not one of law for the court. 
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Lased upor. the: foregoing, respondent respectfully requE:sts 
tb.a~ this Court affirm the lower court's decision. 
I I 
Res-J:lect£ully submitted, 
/! // .· (--t-L f I L ' ''-<. I.. c / 1-.A-, L d '· "'> 
'D. GI\'RY Cl-LRISTIA='! 
I 
------- I- , -;/ J){. ,. . \. . . 1 .,, . , : I I 1 
'·.U'.ll ·_"-_jU.(z~ '-r/ 
J Atv'1ES R. BLAI<ESLE:f 
KIPP AND CHRISTL\:\ 
600 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, ·~ ta't 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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